Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Greece
Delegate Name: Samarth Kaukuntla
It is The Hellenic Republic’s conviction that any promises or actions toward disarmament without verification of progress are ineffective. The Disarmament and International Security Committee recognizes that disarmament remains the ultimate objective in order to maintain international peace. However, meaningful contributions to disarmament require robust, structured, enforceable, legally backed, and credible verification methods. As such, as stated by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “It is Greece’s conviction that the international architecture of non-proliferation and disarmament must not only be maintained but also further enhanced.” Greece supports any efforts made to advance non-proliferation via the verification of disarmament and recognizes that successful measures have been established and will support any actions taken under Articles III and IV of the Non Proliferation Treaty and relevant provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute. Iran’s acceptance of IAEA oversight following the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on its nuclear programs, as endorsed by United Security Council Resolution 2231, serves as an example of effective measures taken to advance the verification of disarmament and urges the promotion of similar initiatives targeted at all UN Member States to ensure proper steps are being taken to ensure that disarmament can occur. To achieve this, increased transparency and strengthened verification authorities with enforceable capabilities beyond those of the IAEA must be incorporated in order to ensure compliance and build international trust.
Greece supports negotiations toward the passing of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty consistent with the mandates introduced during the Conference of Disarmament to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally verifiable treaty that would contain an effective verification mechanism that is both legally binding and enforceable. Without verifiable limitations on fissile material production, Greece fears that meaningful nuclear disarmament cannot progress sustainably due to the lack of accountability that would result from a disregard of these programs by States, further creating a precedent of non-compliance toward disarmament initiatives that could undermine current and future non-proliferation initiatives. Furthermore, Greece has supported the JCPOA as an initial basis that proves that detailed inspections and monitoring provisions can lead to transparency. While committed to the goal of disarmament, Greece has not acceded to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons because of its lack of necessary framework or essential verification mechanisms to address the complex nuances that arise from the elimination of nuclear weaponry and, as such, it cannot be used as an effective channel for achieving disarmament. Any new instruments or projects aimed at achieving disarmament in a realistic manner must contain sophisticated frameworks and enforceable verification provisions to be worthwhile or credible.
Greece further supports full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, primarily Operative Clauses 2 and 3, which due to its incorporation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, has the necessary mechanisms to ensure that all States prevent non-State actors from acquiring WMDs, and urges the passing of resolutions with the power to enforce verification of disarmament. In an era marked by exploitation of emerging technologies and increasing geopolitical tensions stemming from the spread of dangerous weaponry, strengthening verification becomes more and more of a necessity in order to prevent more radical conflicts.
Greece therefore advocates for enhanced inspection authorities or increased integration of verification powers into existing authorities, greater technological integration in monitoring systems, including expanded adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol, specifically Articles 3 and 6, and enhanced inspections by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and increased cooperation and transparency between members of the IAEA, the OPCW, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, and any relevant UN bodies. The Hellenic Republic maintains that disarmament must be gradual, legally binding, and verifiable, and calls upon all DISEC Member States to favor and prioritize the monitoring of new and existing technology via innovation in verification mechanism over unregulated growth that could lead to non-State actors gaining control of powerful WMDs. Greece, in addition, urges the international community to act decisively, promote transparency, and enforce accountability, reinforcing international peace and security through cooperative, legally-backed measures.
Works Cited:
“Non – Proliferation and Disarmament (Weapons of Mass Destruction) – Hellenic Republic – Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” Hellenic Republic – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 June 2024, www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/non-proliferation-and-disarmament-weapons-of-mass-destruction/.
International Atomic Energy Agency. “Non-Proliferation Treaty.” International Atomic Energy Agency, 8 June 2016, www.iaea.org/topics/non-proliferation-treaty.
“Greece.” ICAN, www.icanw.org/greece.
“Resolution 1540 (2004)” Un.org, 2025, docs.un.org/en/S/RES/1540(2004).
United Nations. “Disarmament.” United Nations, 2022, www.un.org/en/global-issues/disarmament.
