Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Ukraine
Delegate Name: Nidha Fathima Abdul Malik
Verification is one of the most important parts of disarmament. It means checking that countries have actually reduced or eliminated their weapons instead of secretly keeping them. Verification helps build trust between states and prevents cheating. It applies to many types of weapons, including nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional arms. Without strong verification systems, disarmament agreements lose credibility and countries may begin to distrust one another. When trust breaks down, arms races and conflict can follow.
Ukraine strongly supports reliable and effective verification mechanisms. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to give up these weapons under the Budapest Memorandum in exchange for security assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. Ukraine fulfilled its obligations, and its nuclear disarmament was verified. However, violations of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in later years have raised serious concerns about the strength of security assurances and enforcement mechanisms. This experience has shaped Ukraine’s view that verification alone is not enough; disarmament must also be backed by accountability and real consequences for violations.
Ukraine calls on the United Nations to strengthen international verification systems by improving inspection procedures, increasing transparency, and supporting independent monitoring organizations. Ukraine believes verification processes must be clear, professional, and protected from political interference. At the same time, the international community must ensure that when states violate disarmament commitments or security assurances, there are meaningful consequences. By strengthening both verification and accountability, the United Nations can restore trust in disarmament agreements and promote long-term international security.
Sources:
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Disarmament Documents Library: Reports and Resources. United Nations, https://disarmament.unoda.org/publications/library/61-ga-sg-report/?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 15 Feb. 2026.
International Atomic Energy Agency. Safeguards and Verification. IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-and-verification?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 15 Feb. 2026.
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Verification Division. OPCW, https://www.opcw.org/about/technical-secretariat/divisions/verification?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 15 Feb. 2026.
Budjeryn, Mariana, and Matthew Bunn. Budapest Memorandum at 25: Between Past and Future. Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Mar. 2020, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/budapest-memorandum-25-between-past-and-future. Accessed 15 Feb. 2026. (Belfer Center)
Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 15 Feb. 2026. (Wikipedia)
