Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Republic of Korea
Delegate Name: Anish Kulkarni
Committee: Disarmament and International Security Committee
Topic: Verification of Disarmament
Country: Republic of Korea
Delegate Name: Anish Kulkarni
The effectiveness of disarmament efforts fundamentally stem from credible verification. Without reliable verification mechanisms, treaties risk becoming symbols rather than enforcers. International Disarmament verification strengthens confidence, deters covert weaponry programs, and prevents arms races. The Republic of Korea, however, has seen existing mechanisms that conduct safeguards like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) already provide verification in this politically sensitive environment. Further bilateral agreements like the New START Treaty further illustrate how on-site inspections, data exchanges, and national cooperation can provide transparency between strategic competitors. However, when trust deteriorates, when international organizations fail, and geopolitical tensions rise, verification is the first mechanism to collapse, undermining disarmament efforts.
For the Republic of Korea, verification is not an abstract concept, rather a matter of immediate national security. The Korean Peninsula remains as one of the world’s most militarized regions, and the failure of past diplomatic efforts towards nuclear disarmament has demonstrated the importance of verification. The suspension of inspection in international cases, including the disruptions in cooperation with the IAEA, highlights the fragility of trust when verification is compromised. As seen with volatile regional states the erosion of verification mechanism leads to renewed weapons development, increased uncertainty, and heightened tensions. Thus, the Republic of Korea supports further international safeguards under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including a universal adoption of the Additional Protocol (AP) to allow expanded transparency for undeclared nuclear sites.
The Republic of Korea also recognizes that verification challenges extend beyond nuclear weapons. While the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) benefits from a highly structured inspection regime, other conventions for weapons of mass destruction, such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), lack binding verification mechanisms, creating a gap for the goal of global disarmament. These conventional weapons and missile systems present additional difficulties as their production capacity and storage can be concealed within industrial civilian infrastructure. In a region where the Republic of Korea has seen active missile testing which could directly impact civilian populations, trans[arent reporting and notification mechanisms are essential for stability.
Drawing from regional experience, the Republic of Korea proposes 3 targeted initiatives to this committee that will improve the verification of disarmament globally. First is to establish a Verification Support Framework that would help prepare technical infrastructure and supply trained personnel for rapid deployment through the Verification Research, Training and Informative Centre (VERTIC) in the event of a future nuclear disarmament agreement. The Republic of Korea believes that this framework should coordinate with the IAEA and relevant UN bodies while still ensuring regional participation. Second, the Republic of Korea supports the creation of regional risk reduction mechanisms including annual transparency dialogues, military hotlines and notification of missile or conventional arms testing to prevent miscalculation and increase transparency. Lastly the Republic of Korea advocates the design for a Technology and Data Verification Initiative to strengthen confidence in inspection processes and prevent disruptions that undermine cooperation. This initiative would promote the use of standardized cybersecurity protocols for inspection technologies and data-sharing platforms to ensure verification data is accurate as well as being protected from manipulation. The Republic of Korea believes that integrating these three policy initiatives into a resolution would sustain long-term compliance and stability of disarmament agreements in the future.
The Republic of Korea remains committed to finding a pragmatic approach that balances credible verification with sovereignty, responsible technology leadership, and multilateral cooperation for all of the international community.
