Topic: Autonomous Weapon Systems
Country: Argentina
Delegate Name: Collin Sharpe
School: Royal Oak High School
Topic page: background guide and all position papers All Argentina position papers GLIMUN 2015 committees
On March 1, 1999, the Ottawa Treaty, created by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, was entered into force. As it’s title suggests, it’s purpose was to “…put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines…”. This was because of the terrible, unintended consequences of their placement. Noncombatants, innocent civilians who had no idea that there was an explosive right under their feet, were stepping on them. The collateral damage caused by the mines that, at the time of the treaty, killed or maimed …”hundreds of people every week…” was in no way acceptable by any means. It sought to ban anti-personnel mines and destroy as many stockpiles of them as they could. Argentina, the whole of Latin America, and, indeed, the vast majority of the member states, 162 of 193, are parties to this treaty. The world recognized the destructive potential of weapons that are capable of indiscriminately killing civilians, and tried to put a stop to it.
We, the members of the United Nations, have an opportunity to stop a similar and potentially more destructive situation before it starts. Autonomous weapons systems, defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross, are weapons “…that can select (i.e. search for or detect, identify, track) and attack (i.e. intercept, use force against, neutralise, damage or destroy) targets without human intervention.” These weapons are machines that do not rely upon human judgement, reasoning, and adaptability to change, which is currently far superior to any kind of programming we have today. Instead, they have to rely upon far simpler programming that is uncertain in its very nature. That fact, along with the variable and dynamic environments found in a war, creates a huge amount of room for error. This error can and will cause innocent civilians to die.This cannot be allowed, and is not justifiable in any way. The decision of whether or not to strip someone of their life is too serious a matter to be delegated to a machine, and can only be left to the superior judgement of humans. This can also create an “accountability gap” where nobody is directly responsible for any unintended deaths, as nobody directly fired a weapon.
Another concern that these weapons pose, which Argentina has expressed concern about in a statement to the UN Human Rights Council representing GRULAC in 2013, are that in using them, we may become morally and ethically divorced from the conflicts we send them into. This can cause us to not feel the impact of lives lost and countries ripped apart by our actions, creating a normalization of conflict. This normalization of conflict may lower the threshold of acts of retaliation and cause even more damage without consideration of the impact of our actions.
However, Argentina recognizes the practical and ethical military use of current and future autonomous systems that do not use lethal force, such as electronic jamming systems, autopilot, missile defense systems, and surveillance, which Argentina has made use of itself to track down wealthy tax evaders, and is currently developing military-grade drones for surveillance itself It also recognizes the use of lethal force from these systems as well, as they do not put personnel at risk and can get to places ground troops can’t, having one of the strongest militaries in its region.
This prompts the question of how we can reconcile the utility of autonomous systems in the military and the destructive potential they have for innocent noncombatants in their flawed and limited reasoning and judgement built into their very nature, combined with the disturbing lack of accountability for their actions, and to make sure that states that say they will do so do so.
What Argentina believes a good resolution should consist of is the creation of something similar to the Ottawa Treaty, in that states voluntarily agree to ban within their own territory autonomous systems that can use lethal force without “meaningful human control”, that has built-in compliance mechanisms, such as a regular compliance report or inspection or perhaps withdrawal of aid or trade from other states party to the treaty. Regional treaties, tailored to each region’s needs to be signed by members of regional organizations, could provide more enforcement mechanisms through the regional organization’s powers.
Of course, there must be a concrete definition for “meaningful human control” otherwise it can be interpreted in a way that essentially does nothing to solve the problem. An example of an adequate definition for this term, by Argentina’s terms, would be “Required human control of which of the targets selected by the system are attacked and when the targets selected by the system are attacked.”
This would provide a way for autonomous systems that cannot kill to be free of unnecessary regulation and for necessary regulation to be placed upon those that do This would provide accountability, requiring human judgement for the decision of whether to take a life, and making sure that those that make the call to use the weapons are not distant and isolated from the consequences of their actions and the lives they take.
Of course, in order to make sure that states that say they will implement the necessary regulations actually do so, transparency is necessary. For this purpose, inspectors from the United Nations, similar to the United Nations Special Commission created by United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, to determine whether Iraq had been compliant with its obligations under the Geneva Protocol to destroy its chemical weapons, should be used to make sure that said states are compliant. Argentina recognizes the fact that the DISEC is a General Assembly committee means that any resolutions that are passed are not binding like the Geneva Protocol, but states that deny inspectors access to their weapons facilities will be seen as suspicious. Knowledge of that suspicion may lead a state’s trading partners to reconsider its trade agreements.
Argentina recognizes that there are other facets to this issue, such as other ways autonomous weapons systems can be regulated, the different levels of autonomy they can be given, and the different ways that international humanitarian law applies to these weapons, and hopes to discuss them in committee. It wishes to stop the lack of accountability for the actions of autonomous weapons systems, create a clear-cut definition of what constitutes “meaningful human control” and create regulations in which that definition may be used. It looks forward to accomplishing this and more in committee, and has high hopes for the outcomes of this conference.
Works Cited
"Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction." <i>Int. Rev. Red Cross International Review of the Red Cross</i> 37.320 (1997): 563. Web. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1997/09/19970918%2007-53%20AM/Ch_XXVI_05p.pdf>.
Autonomous Weapons Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects (2014): International Committee of the Red Cross. Geneva, Switzerland 28 Mar. 2014.
