Verification of Disarmament

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Nigeria
Delegate Name: Jack Kolkema

Country: Federal Republic of Nigeria
School: Grand Haven
Committee: DISEC (B)
Topic: Verification of Disarmament

Nigeria firmly believes that verification of disarmament should be achieved through any means necessary. Nigeria believes that the threat that chemical, biological, and especially nuclear weapons pose to the world’s health and the world’s ecosystems far outweighs the cries that states may say that this practice breaches their sovereignty, as a nuclear holocaust or any large-scale effects from WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) does not respect borders. Nigeria is often pointed out as a model state regarding subjects like this, as they operate a purely civilian or scientific nuclear program. Nigeria urges the use of non-governmental organizations to check on states to verify the validity of a disarmament agreement. Nigeria is a signatory and member of many international treaties and agreements regarding this subject.
As a member of the IPNDV, or The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, Nigeria would like to see a adhernece to the “14 step model”, a step by step process with many checkpoints designed by the IPNDV to create a safe and responsible way for a state to dispose of WMD, and possibly see the practices used in this model be expanded or modified for biological and chemical weapons. Nigeria is also a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and is therefore a staunch believer in the power of the IAEA, or the International Atomic Energy Agency, to conduct non-biased and thorough verifications of disarmament. NAM, which Nigeria is a member of, regarded the New START (Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms) treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, a treaty that allows both countries to survey WMD locations to verify the treaty guarantees, as a great step forward in verification, showing that many WMD’s are made because of a fear of another, and that agreements between hostile nations like New START can help melt the ice between two states and possibly provide a framework for other similar situations.
Any solution regarding diplomacy and agreements to verify disarmament is favorable to Nigeria. Nigeria feels the use of 3rd party organizations or agencies helps ensure the most integrity, as self verification would be too easy to falsify and a foreign government agency would violate a state’s sovereignty. But, as mentioned earlier, the New START treaty, a treaty not involving any 3rd parties, was also a positive in this world, as if 2 nations agree to trust each other, bilateral agreements copying the New Start would be something Nigeria would like to see. A good course of action would be for Nigeria to create or help push forward a resolution that strengthens the IAEA to monitor high risk disarmament, and possibly widens the authority to include chemical and biological WMDs, keeping the world safe. Nigeria would also like any sort of resolution that creates a framework for nations with WMDs to establish and debate on what grounds they would scrap their WMDs, and allow each other to check in on each other to see whether they meet the obligations, through an agency like the IAEA.

Works Cited
“About the Nuclear Disarmament Verification Initiative.” IPNDV, https://www.ipndv.org/about/. Accessed 10 February 2026.

Endoni, Syndoph P. Statement by Nigeria UNGA79. 7 October 2024, https://docs-library.unoda.org/General_Assembly_First_Committee_-Seventy-Ninth_session_(2024)/Nigeria.pdf. Accessed 10 February 2026.

“Nigeria.” Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, https://banmonitor.org/profiles/nigeria. Accessed 10 February 2026.

“Statement by Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.” October 2023, https://docs-library.unoda.org/General_Assembly_First_Committee_-Seventy-Eighth_session_(2023)/qn15G7zaRYSF_en.pdf. Accessed 10 February 2026.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Slovenia
Delegate Name: Jonah H Beute

Committee: Disarmament and International Security Committee
Topic B: Verification of Disarmament
Country: Slovenia
Delegate: Jonah H. Beute
School: Grand Haven High School

Through thick and thin, Slovenia has always been a nation who has implemented the many resolutions in the disarmament of weapons. Through these resolutions Slovenia has implemented, they have always allowed for transparency in and during the verification process of disarmament and has had no trouble with it. With this, Slovenia has always firmly believed the importance of this process and the important confirmation it brings over to the international community at large. This is due to Slovenia firmly believing that violence isn’t the answer and that with verification, it calms down and assures the international community as a whole.
Currently there are multiple processes for the verification of disarmament. These include sending independent inspectors to another country to confirm the disarmament and/or doing a technology verification of the process, which has been more common in recent years. Slovenia believes that this process for disarmament is effective, but it could be improved with increased transparency. More transparency from countries who are currently going through the process of verification, would help make sure that the information given from the inspections is factual, accurate, and that the country is actually actively going through the process of disarmament. In a resolution, Slovenia would love to see a resolution that would call for the increased transparency of nations that currently don’t provide that information to the international community.

There are many different organizations that help with the disarmament process. In the past, Slovenia has partnered with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) and other organizations like the European External Action Service (EEAS) which all help in verifying disarmament in nations. There’s also some that Slovenia, while not a part of some groups like the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) , firmly supports them and their actions for verification. These organizations all help either confirm and verify the process of disarmament in nations that have agreed on past resolutions, or come up with solutions that help with the process of verification. Such as, developing better on sight inspections, developing better technology for these inspections, and more. These organizations are great in helping and confirming that resolutions are being implemented, but there can be some improvements. To strengthen these organizations, but while also making sure that they don’t impede on another nation’s sovereignty, Slovenia suggests that countries strengthen international connections between verification organizations and or other countries who are verifying them. This is in order to bridge the gap between the many approaches countries have on verification. So in a resolution, Slovenia would look for one that includes a clause that lessens tension between countries in order to make sure that these verifications can happen.

There have been many agreements made about the verification of disarmament. But the one that Slovenia views as a baseline and basis for all future verification resolutions and or treaties is the “Verification In All Its Aspects” resolution, which was made in 1988, but still holds up today. Slovenia supports this due to the resolution setting the baseline of verification within the United Nations. With this as a base line for a future resolution, Slovenia believes that it can be improved upon by adding more transparency to all participating countries in the resolution and by adding more on limiting tensions between countries to make sure that these agreements can last. With these things in mind, Slovenia believes that the verification process can be done in a better way, and a more concrete way that benefits everyone.

Work Cited
“Arms Control | GOV.SI.” Portal GOV.SI, www.gov.si/en/topics/arms-control/. Accessed 9 Feb. 2026.
General, UN. “Verification in All Its Aspects : Resolutions / Adopted by the General Assembly.” United Nations Digital Library System, 7 Dec. 1988, digitallibrary.un.org/record/192729?v=pdf Accessed 10 Feb. 2026.
“Panel on “Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Verification – Past, Present and Future Developments” – EU Key Messages.” EEAS, 2025, www.eeas.europa.eu/node/41975_en. Accessed 10 Feb. 2026.
Statement of Germany General Debate, UN Disarmament Commission 2025.
“Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC).” Organization | NATO, 2025, www.nato.int/en/about-us/organization/nato-structure/verification-coordinating-committee-vcc. Accessed 10 Feb. 2026.
Verification of Each of the 14 Steps of Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement. 2020.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Uzbekistan
Delegate Name: Audrey McLaughlin

Effective verification is necessary in order to ensure that disarmament agreements are credible and enforceable. Without reliable monitoring systems, international treaties risk becoming symbolic rather than impactful. As new technologies and geopolitical tensions emerge, verification mechanisms must adapt to maintain transparency and accountability among all member states. Strong verification processes build trust and reduce the likelihood of non-compliance or secretive rearmament.
The Republic of Uzbekistan has demonstrated its commitment to verifiable disarmament through its participation in the National Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Uzbekistan voluntarily relinquished nuclear weapons stationed on its territory and has since supported the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, which includes verification measures under international oversight. Uzbekistan continues to uphold its obligations through compliance with IAEA safeguards and reporting requirements.
Uzbekistan believes that verification must balance effectiveness with respect for national sovereignty. The Republic supports strengthening the authority and resources of international verification bodies while ensuring that inspections are conducted fairly and impartially. Transparency, data exchange, and cooperative monitoring are key to preventing distrust between nations.
To strengthen global verification systems, Uzbekistan encourages investment in modern technologies such as satellite monitoring and remote sensing, expanded technical assistance for developing countries to meet compliance standards, and increased information-sharing among states. By reinforcing existing institutions and adapting to emerging challenges, the international community can ensure that disarmament commitments are meaningful, transparent, and sustainable.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Seychelles
Delegate Name: Addisyn McLaughlin

Committee: Disarmament and International Security Committee
Topic: Verification of Disarmament
Country: Seychelles
Delegate: Addisyn McLaughlin
Verification of weapons disarmament is essential to ensuring that treaties and agreements established by the United Nations are legally enforceable. Without reliable monitoring and accountability, international treaties risk losing their impact and becoming symbolic commitments rather than meaningful ways of taking action. For Small Island Developing States (SIDS) like Seychelles, global security and stability depend on strong international systems that prevent the spread and rearmament of dangerous weapons.
The Republic of Seychelles has consistently supported disarmament efforts and international cooperation to minimize the production and transportation of these weapons. As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other significant international arms control agreements, Seychelles recognizes the importance of verification mechanisms under the oversight of institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Seychelles supports the role of international monitoring bodies in ensuring compliance and building trust among member states.
Seychelles believes that verification must be impartial and accessible to all nations, regardless of size or military capacity. Smaller states rely on strong international law and fair enforcement to maintain global stability. Strengthening international verification frameworks helps prevent distrust, reduces the risk of hidden weapons programs, and reinforces confidence in disarmament agreements.
To improve global verification systems, Seychelles encourages increased funding and technical support for international monitoring agencies, expanded information sharing between member states, and greater use of modern technologies such as satellite monitoring and data analysis tools. Seychelles also supports capacity building programs that assist developing nations in meeting reporting and compliance standards. By strengthening verification processes and reinforcing international cooperation, the global community can ensure that disarmament commitments are meaningful, enforceable, and sustainable. Seychelles remains committed to promoting transparency, accountability, and collective security through effective multilateral action.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Zimbabwe
Delegate Name: Dylan Zobol

Zimbabwe
SIMUN DISEC
Model UN
2/8/2026

Verification of Disarmament:
Zimbabwe would want the approval. Zimbabwe, as a small country, wants to ensure its safety if any conflict occurs globally. Nuclear weapons historically have not been popular in Zimbabwe, ratifying several treaties such as the CSA with the IAEA in 1995. Which supported the peaceful use of nuclear technology, which developed nuclear energy programs. They also did this to uphold international nuclear safety and security standards.

Zimbabwe’s neighbor and close ally, South Africa, has ceased all further missile development as it joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Although they did not get rid of them. Zimbabwe, as a political ally, shares many similar values with our neighbor. Zimbabwe itself expressed concerns about biological and chemical weapons on October 22nd, 2025, at a UN conference. At this confrenc they applauded the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons).

Zimbabwe’s stance on nuclear weapons is that they should all be eliminated, as previously stated in September 2024 at the Trusteeship Council Chamber, “Nuclear weapons pose an unimaginable existential threat to all humanity.” It was at this council where they announced that they would begin a ratification process for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The TPNW was adopted in July of 2017 and put into force in January of 2021.
To ensure its safety, Zimbabwe would be in full support of the verification of disarmament, as large-scale people of war have beem consistantly been underfire by the country. Zimbabwe looks forward to building consensus around this issue with other member nations present in the committee.

https://banmonitor.org/the-tpnw
https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/other/IDTENW/2024/Zimbabwe.pdf
https://banmonitor.org/profiles/zimbabwe#:~:text=At%20a%20high%2Dlevel%20UN,’
https://docs-library.unoda.org/General_Assembly_First_Committee_-Eightieth_session_(2025)/noWBDIoIacjRJ_nyc_en.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_Technology_Control_Regime

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: China
Delegate Name: Rayyan Abu Azine

Submitted to the Disarmament and International Security Committee
From: Republic of Saudi Arabia
Delegate Name: Rayyan Abu Azrine
Subject: Verification of Disarmament

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1946, disarmament has been one of the organization’s main priorities. Disarmament has been crucial for 80 years to maintain international peace and security. Many treaties have been made in those 80 years, to list a few, including the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (CWC), which has been a cornerstone in mutual nuclear agreement, or even the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits chemical weapons. On top of these agreements lay many other significant treaties. The main problem that lies with these agreements is that there is no true way of verification without risking sovereignty or security. This is due to the fact that many of these countries are in handshake/gentleman agreements with no commitments set in stone.
Previously, methods included a political and technical process that starts with a mutual agreement between parties and inspectors who do routine inspections in various countries with satellite imagery, data exchange, and other specialized equipment. Examples of verification agencies include the IAEA, which specifically specializes in atomic disarmament and conversion to renewable energy.
Saudi Arabia has been quite public about the country’s support for Non-Proliferation and disarmament. The kingdom has repeatedly reiterated the importance of a world free of nuclear weapons, and especially the Middle East free of nuclear weapons. Being one of the main signatories of the NPT, Saudi Arabia has committed to not develop or acquire nuclear weapons. The kingdom has also been in support of oversight committees, like the IAEA, and have ephasized greater oversight and suggests other countries move towards their safeguards as well. Defense strategies such as regional alliances have also proved to be effective. Although not a verification solution, it has extended deterrence implications for any country that heightens military activity.
Saudi Arabia is officially and fully committed to an international agreement on disarmament norms, non-proliferation, and increased participation in treaty negotiations through means of enhanced voluntary transparency with the International Atomic Energy Agency and alternative methods of peace within this committee.

Nations, United. “Disarmament.” United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/disarmament. Accessed 8 Feb. 2026.
Topychkanov , Tytti Erästö, Ugnė Komžaitė, Petr. Operationalizing Nuclear Disarmament Verification. Accessed 8 Feb. 2026.
“Understanding Nuclear Disarmament and Verification.” International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament, 17 May 2017, https://www.ipndv.org/learn/understanding-nuclear-disarmament/#:~:text=Developing%20and%20implementing%20verification%20activities,Dismantlement%20Interactive%20for%20more%20information.
Middle East Monitor, 7 Apr. 2022, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220407-saudi-arabia-reiterates-support-for-middle-east-free-of-nuclear-weapons/.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Japan
Delegate Name: Stella Rogers

02/01/2026
Submitted to: Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)
From: Japan
Topic: Verification of Disarmament

The Nation of Japan stands firmly behind the verification of disarmament. A verifiable, transparent disarmament system is essential for trust, compliance, and security for the entire global community and the citizens within every nation that hangs in the balance due to fear produced from nuclear weapons.
Japan, the single standing nation that has experienced the destruction of nuclear weapons first-hand, is strongly behind the implementation of arms control progress, especially nuclear weapons. Our nation views nuclear weapons as a major threat to international peace and security, and can support this view from personal experiences as being the only nation attacked with nuclear weapons during the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War Two. Since World War Two, Japan has promoted Nuclear non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy, and strong verification regimes. We’ve seen how disarmament without verification led to mistrust and arms races, and by implication, verification, we ensure accountability through technical and scientific means.
Within the UN, Japan is a consistent supporter of disarmament and verification resolutions such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Our nation is an active participant in UN Disarmament Commission discussions and groups of governmental and scientific experts on disarmament verification, and takes pride in playing a bridge-builder role between nuclear and non-nuclear states. The nation of Japan has three general non-nuclear principles regarding nuclear weapons: no possession of nuclear weapons, no production of nuclear weapons, and no introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Our nation strongly supports and implements the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with full IAEA safeguards, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its verification system.
We believe that meaningful disarmament cannot exist without transparent verification, and that verification is the foundation for long-term international security. Japan stands ready to cooperate with all nations, both nuclear and non-nuclear alike, to advance a global security system that is upheld through cooperation, transparency, and mutual trust rather than fear and suspicion.

Sources
“The Adoption of the Draft Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Submitted by Japan in the Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2025, www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01874.html.
ICAN. “Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombings.” ICAN, ICAN, 2018, www.icanw.org/hiroshima_and_nagasaki_bombings.
“First Committee Takes 18 Separate Votes to Approve Japan-United States Draft Resolution on Common Road Map to World without Nuclear Weapons | UN Press.” Press.un.org, press.un.org/en/2022/gadis3702.doc.htm.
“History and Overview | Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology (CDAST) | Research Centers | the Japan Institute of International Affairs.” Jiia.or.jp, 2019, www.jiia.or.jp/eng/project/topic-cdast/history/.
CTBTO. “The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) | CTBTO.” Www.ctbto.org, 2023, www.ctbto.org/our-mission/the-treaty.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: China
Delegate Name: Cameron Balis

2/1/26
Submitted to: DISEC
From: China
Topic: Verification of Disarmament

The world has been shaped by warfare. We now see that with much larger weapons than 80 years ago, naturally, the debate on these weapons that can be produced in mass clearly presents itself to this United Nations body. China believes that Verification of Disarmament of weapons is a high encroachment on a nation’s sovereignty. There are too many unanswered questions regarding who will conduct these verification inspections. For instance, what are the criteria to make it objective so it is not biased? To elaborate, how does an inspection ensure that a country is not lying about where its stockpile of weapons is? And, how do you ensure that a country will not just rearm the same missiles that they just disarmed for an inspection? With these questions, no major country should ever agree to whatever these concessions will be.
The People’s Republic of China does not see that this is a problem that the United Nations needs to be involved in. We are in a world where a first strike is going to be a constant threat, so why should we focus on disarmament? Instead, this is a situation for better diplomacy between nations, so that we might work together to ensure continued geopolitical peace. All while they each have weapons to defend themselves and their interests.
The committee for Disarmament and International Security should instead focus its efforts on diplomatic solutions between nations, ensuring that a peaceful resolution that benefits all sides will endure through debate. Instead of focusing on a topic of futility where the United Nations would instead upset a country’s national sovereignty due to encroachment, we should focus on the equality of major nations in debate on major issues. To also combat the inequality of verification, China would be willing to fund and have oversight over these proliferation agreements, along with assisting in the verification of disarmament, so that all countries have a voice in this mass movement.

Works Cited-
https://www.state.gov/releases/2026/02/statement-to-the-conference-on-disarmament/
https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2025-12-11/china-signals-continuity-nuclear-policy-paper
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/sipriinsight1904_0.pdf

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Algeria
Delegate Name: Aeriq Abu Azrine

2/4/26
Submitted to: DISEC
From: People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria
Topic: Verification of Disarmament

On the issue of verification of disarmament, Algeria acknowledges that there are concerns about intrusive inspection practices, this could be used for intelligence gathering or exploited for political pressure. On the other side of that equation though, ending inspections could be used for retaliations, or used to threaten and bargained a better deal. This just are a very small point on why verification of disarmament must be handled with the utmost caution.. As Algeria is committed to regional peace and security, we must uphold the values of national sovereignty, non-interference, and multilateralism.
As the role of verification plays a massive part in building confidence and trust between nations, it must be done in a manner that is non-discriminatory and balanced. Past legislation that aims to limit ballistic missiles has disproportionately targeted developing nations while allowing nuclear states to delay or evade their own disarmament obligations. Such a double standard weakens the credibility of international disarmament efforts and fails as a means of safeguarding non-nuclear-weapon states.
To sum it up, Algeria supports a transparent verification method that builds trust, invites cooperation, and is built on an equal footing. We want to create a transparent and secure system that will not be a treaty built on a fishing line but a treaty that will be influenced and have consequences. Algeria is confident in the fact that regional security is able to be sustained for the near future and is willing to be a felicitator of that.
Sources
https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/2023-09/AFC23_Algeria.pdf
https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_(2023)/CD.2315Algeria_FINAL_(04-09-2023).pdf

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: India
Delegate Name: Ben Stuart

DELEGATE: Benjamin Stuart
COUNTRY: Republic of India
COMMITTEE: Disarmament & International Security Committee
TOPIC: Verification of Disarmament

Disarmament and non proliferation agreements are delicate at the best of times which makes it essential to have strong methods to verify disarmament. If these tenuous understandings are broken it could be detrimental to the rest of the world.

India has fraught relationships with some countries, most notably Pakistan and is eager to lower tensions. It advocates for confidence building measures. These include the sharing of nuclear information, hotlines, informing before missile tests, and allowed surveillance flights over certain facilities. Confidence building measures have been used previously in bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan and between the United States and Russia.

Of course confidence building measures aren’t enough to ensure disarmament. India is open to alternatives such as third party inspection. If the organizations selected are strictly objective and unbiased they could prove a boon to disarmament. India in the past however has been a victim of unfair non-proliferation treaties. Without proper vetting of third party organizations India would be wary.

Overall India feels there are a variety of solutions to the all important issue of verifying disarmament. India looks forward to discussion with the Disarmament & International Security Committee.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Mongolia
Delegate Name: Yassmin Aboelezz

Disarmament & International Security Committee (DISEC)
Mongolia
Verification of Disarmament
Yassmin Aboelezz

Verification of disarmament ensures that a state is complying with an agreement regarding the use of different forms of weapons. There are currently treaties among certain countries for verification of disarmament (nuclear/chemical/biological), but are all non-binding. However, through the United Nations, VERTIC (Verification Research, Training and Information Centre) a London-based non-profit (NGO) trains groups to verify nuclear and chemical disarmament (“VERTIC – the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre”). Verification of disarmament affects countries with high amounts of weapons that are seeking non-proliferation. Similarly, as a part of being in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), verification is an essential step to ensuring the path to decreasing the creation and use of weapons of multiple forms (“How Is the Ban Treaty Verifiable?”). VERTIC is constantly making progress with nations in the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and support through research and analysis on verification regimes and implementation in a series of openly available publications. For example, in an article published February 5th, 2026 by VERTIC, Caroline Higgins reports on a new project funded by the Consortium to reduce nuclear dangers in China. Currently, VERTIC is working to promote transparency with China regarding their nuclear weapon stockpiles (“VERTIC – the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre”).
Mongolia stands against the use of weapons and the verification of disarmament. Mongolia is a member of both the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). We ratified the NPT in 1969, later Mongolia was accepted to the TPNW on March 10, 2022 (“Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status | United Nations Platform for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones”). We place an importance on verification of disarmament and promoting the increase of such to other states.
Mongolia has taken multiple measures to ensure disarmament and extend such opportunity to other states. In the declaration of Mongolia, as of 2000, Mongolia has pledged not to station or transport nuclear weapons. Similarly, as of June 2015, resolution 60 was adopted aimed at strengthening the nuclear weapon free zone status further. On June 9-10, 2022, the Mongolian non-governmental organization “Blue Banner” organized a regional gathering of scholars and experts in Ulaanbaatar to discuss the importance, challenges and prospects of NWFZ development. The UN was represented by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD) showing the importance of verification for disarmament to the state of Mongolia (“Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status | United Nations Platform for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones”).
Mongolia supports the furthering of The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to involve more countries and take further steps ensuring verification of disarmament through NGOs such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA works with member states to promote safe nuclear technologies and verify the non-proliferation of weapons such as ballistic missiles (“VERTIC – the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre”). This solution would work toward promoting more incentives for countries that take extra steps to ensure disarmament. Incentives could include, but are not limited to, promoting exports, reduced tariffs on international trade, stronger allyships, etc. Mongolia complies with the verification of disarmament and has taken multiple steps to ensure it. Therefore, this solution would promote that further and fully aligns with Mongolia’s goals regarding nuclear disarmament and the verification of such.
Mongolia supports the verification of disarmament and has taken multiple measures such as joining the NPT and later the TPNW. Similarly, we promote solutions that further these programs to ensure transparency and the non-proliferation of ballistic nuclear weapons. Cooperation is essential to verifying disarmament. Weapons of all kinds have caused dangers and harm to citizens throughout the world, it is essential to decrease that as much as humanely possible via collaboration and a shared goal.
Works Cited
“A Brief History of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.” Si.edu, 5 June 2017, airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/brief-history-anti-ballistic-missile-systems.
Burnett, Alistair. “Can Missile Defence against Nuclear Attack Work?” ICAN, 2025, www.icanw.org/can_missile_defence_against_nuclear_attack_work.
CIA. “Mongolia – the World Factbook.” Www.cia.gov, 3 Sept. 2024, www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/mongolia/.
“Disarmament | United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.” Unoda.org, 29 Aug. 2025, disarmament.unoda.org/en.
“Government and Politics.” Embassy of Mongolia, 21 May 2013, mongolianembassy.us/about-mongolia/government-and-politics/.
“How Is the Ban Treaty Verifiable?” ICAN, 2024, www.icanw.org/how_is_the_ban_treaty_verifiable.
Kohanets, Roman. “Russian Ballistic Missile Hits US Company Philip Morris near Kharkiv.” UNITED24 Media, 30 Jan. 2026, united24media.com/latest-news/russian-ballistic-missile-hits-us-company-philip-morris-near-kharkiv-15514. Accessed 3 Feb. 2026.
“Missiles | United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.” Unoda.org, 2025, disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/emerging-challenges/missiles.
“Mongolia’s Nuclear Policy: From Security to Serotype Research.” Global Asia, www.globalasia.org/v12no1/feature/mongolias-nuclear-policy-from-security-to-serotype-research_j-enkhsaikhan.
“Mongolian Public Diplomacy: Where It Stands and What Can Be Done?” USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 23 Feb. 2024, uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/mongolian-public-diplomacy-where-it-stands-and-what-can-be-done.
“Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status | United Nations Platform for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.” Www.un.org, www.un.org/nwfz/content/mongolias-nuclear-weapon-free-status.
“Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status of Mongolia.” The Nuclear Threat Initiative, 18 Apr. 2024, www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/nuclear-weapon-free-status-mongolia/.
“The United Nations in Mongolia | United Nations in Mongolia.” Mongolia.un.org, mongolia.un.org/en/about/about-the-un.
“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) | United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.” Unoda.org, 2025, disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons.
“Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons | United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.” Unoda.org, 2025, disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons.
“VERTIC – the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre.” Vertic, 18 Jan. 2023, www.vertic.org/.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: United Kingdom
Delegate Name: Felix Tlachac

The United Kingdom has the fewest nuclear warheads out of the five nuclear-weapon states. They established a cap of 180 warheads in 2010, but this cap was increased to 260 in 2021. The United Kingdom has four Vanguard-level submarines, with at least one deployed at all times. Despite this cap, the United Kingdom is in possession of 22 tons of highly-enriched uranium and 3.2 tons of plutonium. The UK claims that they look to reduce the number of warheads back to 180 in the mid-2020s; it has not done anything to affect the number. The United Kingdom is highly hesitant to use its nuclear missiles, like the Trident, despite always having them deployed. They use the minimum nuclear power required to deter other nation-states from attacking them. Out of all nuclear weapons treaties, the United Kingdom has signed the Tlatelolco,  Rarotonga,  Pelindaba, and Semipalatinsk Treaties. The only one they have not signed is the Bangkok Treaty. This is because the Bangkok Treaty is meant to create a weapon-free zone across purely ASEAN countries. The Treaty of Tlatelolco applies to Latin American and Caribbean countries; the Treaty of Rarotonga applies to the South Pacific; the Treaty of Pelindaba applies to all of Africa.
The United Kingdom verifies disarmament with the Atomic Weapons Establishment, owned by the Ministry of Defense. The AWE helps to produce and research nuclear weapons for the United Kingdom. The AWE also splits this monitoring into five categories: inventory verification, containment and surveillance, equipment integrity, facility and process verification, and verification theory and modeling. International powers also help with other parts included in these five main areas. The United Kingdom is partnered with the United States in the United Kingdom-United States bilateral technical cooperation. These two verify that the other is following the rules, and in return, they share classified nuclear research and information with each other.
The United Kingdom is also a part of the Quad Nuclear Verification, with the other countries included being the United States, Sweden, and Norway. Like the US bilateral cooperation, this group helps to verify each other, along with third-party states getting involved. The UK is also involved in the bilateral United Kingdom-Sweden research partnership, which aims to help with the Atomic Weapons Establishment. As of current times, the AWE has investigated high explosives detection and dismantlement facility design requirements. Finally, the United Kingdom is a part of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which is currently working on a solution to policies for nuclear-weapon-possessing states. In the past, it has helped with communication between states and to help bring up issues involving international verification challenges and solutions. In the future, the United Kingdom aims to keep developing solutions for the verification issues. It also aims to provide transparency on the verification, challenges, and impacts of this verification. The United Kingdom encourages other nations to get involved in the verification process, even if they do not have nuclear warheads themselves.

Works Cited
NTI. “Nuclear Disarmament United Kingdom.” NTI, 19 November 2025, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/united-kingdom-nuclear-disarmament/. Accessed 10 February 2026.
United Nations. “Overview of Treaties.” United Nations, https://www.un.org/nwfz/ar/content/treaty-tlatelolco. Accessed 10 February 2026.
United Nations. “2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” United Nations, 10 December 2021, https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/WP.34. Accessed 10 February 2026.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Greece
Delegate Name: Samarth Kaukuntla

It is The Hellenic Republic’s conviction that any promises or actions toward disarmament without verification of progress are ineffective. The Disarmament and International Security Committee recognizes that disarmament remains the ultimate objective in order to maintain international peace. However, meaningful contributions to disarmament require robust, structured, enforceable, legally backed, and credible verification methods. As such, as stated by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “It is Greece’s conviction that the international architecture of non-proliferation and disarmament must not only be maintained but also further enhanced.” Greece supports any efforts made to advance non-proliferation via the verification of disarmament and recognizes that successful measures have been established and will support any actions taken under Articles III and IV of the Non Proliferation Treaty and relevant provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute. Iran’s acceptance of IAEA oversight following the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on its nuclear programs, as endorsed by United Security Council Resolution 2231, serves as an example of effective measures taken to advance the verification of disarmament and urges the promotion of similar initiatives targeted at all UN Member States to ensure proper steps are being taken to ensure that disarmament can occur. To achieve this, increased transparency and strengthened verification authorities with enforceable capabilities beyond those of the IAEA must be incorporated in order to ensure compliance and build international trust.
Greece supports negotiations toward the passing of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty consistent with the mandates introduced during the Conference of Disarmament to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally verifiable treaty that would contain an effective verification mechanism that is both legally binding and enforceable. Without verifiable limitations on fissile material production, Greece fears that meaningful nuclear disarmament cannot progress sustainably due to the lack of accountability that would result from a disregard of these programs by States, further creating a precedent of non-compliance toward disarmament initiatives that could undermine current and future non-proliferation initiatives. Furthermore, Greece has supported the JCPOA as an initial basis that proves that detailed inspections and monitoring provisions can lead to transparency. While committed to the goal of disarmament, Greece has not acceded to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons because of its lack of necessary framework or essential verification mechanisms to address the complex nuances that arise from the elimination of nuclear weaponry and, as such, it cannot be used as an effective channel for achieving disarmament. Any new instruments or projects aimed at achieving disarmament in a realistic manner must contain sophisticated frameworks and enforceable verification provisions to be worthwhile or credible.
Greece further supports full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, primarily Operative Clauses 2 and 3, which due to its incorporation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, has the necessary mechanisms to ensure that all States prevent non-State actors from acquiring WMDs, and urges the passing of resolutions with the power to enforce verification of disarmament. In an era marked by exploitation of emerging technologies and increasing geopolitical tensions stemming from the spread of dangerous weaponry, strengthening verification becomes more and more of a necessity in order to prevent more radical conflicts.
Greece therefore advocates for enhanced inspection authorities or increased integration of verification powers into existing authorities, greater technological integration in monitoring systems, including expanded adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol, specifically Articles 3 and 6, and enhanced inspections by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and increased cooperation and transparency between members of the IAEA, the OPCW, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, and any relevant UN bodies. The Hellenic Republic maintains that disarmament must be gradual, legally binding, and verifiable, and calls upon all DISEC Member States to favor and prioritize the monitoring of new and existing technology via innovation in verification mechanism over unregulated growth that could lead to non-State actors gaining control of powerful WMDs. Greece, in addition, urges the international community to act decisively, promote transparency, and enforce accountability, reinforcing international peace and security through cooperative, legally-backed measures.

Works Cited:
“Non – Proliferation and Disarmament (Weapons of Mass Destruction) – Hellenic Republic – Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” Hellenic Republic – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 June 2024, www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/global-issues/non-proliferation-and-disarmament-weapons-of-mass-destruction/.
International Atomic Energy Agency. “Non-Proliferation Treaty.” International Atomic Energy Agency, 8 June 2016, www.iaea.org/topics/non-proliferation-treaty.
“Greece.” ICAN, www.icanw.org/greece.
“Resolution 1540 (2004)” Un.org, 2025, docs.un.org/en/S/RES/1540(2004).
United Nations. “Disarmament.” United Nations, 2022, www.un.org/en/global-issues/disarmament.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Russian Federation
Delegate Name: Aishwarya Ramisetty

Topic Background:

The Verification of Disarmament can refer to the intensive analysis of information to determine if a country or state obliges to the reduction of weaponry through techniques such as remote sensing and on-site inspections. While this problem is recognized globally, the Conference on Disarmament, located in Geneva, Switzerland, takes the main initiative. The United Nations is heavily involved in the development of disarmament affairs, working to find a sustainable and realistic solution.

Past International Action:

The United Nations has worked to establish treaties to prevent the testing and production of nuclear weapons, whilst making the shift subtle both to the government and environment. Treaties such as the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) are both examples of solutions to the growing problem of the consequences created by the overproduction of warheads. However, it is important to take into account that the CTBT, while it is a legal-binding contract, has not yet been put in force. It is still a big step towards the growth of gaining international support and peace.

Country Policy:

The Russian Federation contains approximately 5,600 nuclear arsenal. Leaders of Russia believe that arsenal may be utilized in the scenario that national security is threatened. It is crucial to take into account that while it is in our best interests to keep this planet weapon-free, it can be complicated due to the extreme numbers of nuclear items seen globally. To be frank, the concept of “nuclear zero” is highly unrealistic given the amount of ammunition countries possess. There is no quick solution to this conflict, and understandably so. By taking a longer approach, with the assistance of all countries, we will be able to come to the conclusion that, while it may not end with all weapon supply depleted, the majority of weaponry will be limited and restricted worldwide.

With the New START Treaty coming to an expiration (expired as of February 2026), the Russian Federation believes that the United States reciprocating the actions of keeping a standardized limit to their production of nuclear weapons will ensure a safer, stronger connection internationally.

Possible Solutions:

The Russian Federation has proposed a one-year extension on the New START Treaty, to last throughout the year 2026, but was rejected by President Trump. It is within our best efforts that the United States reconsiders this rejection, to have a basis on resolving this crisis while working to provide a long-term solution. Seeing that the UN wishes to extend on this treaty as well, Russia sees no issue in giving support to this particular project.

Seeing that the United States, alongside Russia, are bearers of the most nuclear weapons, it is only logical that we stand together in creating a stronger foundation to work to restore balance and harmony internationally. Even if the treaty is not extended, we should attempt to create a similar contract to keep each other accountable and provide restrictions amongst each other.

Sources:
https://docs.un.org/en/GE-NDVF/2023/WP.11

https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/disarmament

https://www.ctbto.org/our-mission/the-treaty

https://www.icanw.org/russia

https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons

https://www.state.gov/new-start-treaty

https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/regprla/2055214/

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: South Africa
Delegate Name: Alekya Velaga

Topic Background:
Verification is referred to as the method used to verify whether countries comply with their disarmament commitments. Examples of these methods are monitoring systems which include: inspection and transparency to ensure the weapons are being eliminated as agreed upon such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This problem is most commonly seen throughout nations, governments, and global organizations such as the United Nations. It also affects millions of people around the world, helping protect citizens. This concept started due to the World War II events, especially due to the menace caused by unverified weapons development during the Cold War, where most nations developed a handful of nuclear weapons.
Past International Action:
The United Nations has been supporting disarmament issues through treaties, inspections, and cooperating organizations. Take for example, The International Atomic Energy Agency plays a critical role in monitoring nuclear facilities. Also ensuring that countries agree upon non-proliferation obligations. The UN also promotes transparency through the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, which helps countries to report and verify for disarmaments.
However, there are two perspectives to this matter. Those who support verification believe that it strengthens security on a global scale and transparency. On the other hand, others might think that these rigorous inspections may weaken states of sovereignty and also might reveal confidential information. Despite this, the UN has continued to ensure that there is a secured balance between the sovereignty of states.
Country Policy:
Historically, verification of disarmament has affected South Africa because it has become one of the very few countries in the world that have destroyed their nuclear weapons program. As a result, its position was finalized as a country of nonproliferation and peace. South Africa has supported the treaties on nuclear disarmament and promoted the principle of use of nuclear energy.
Possible Solutions:
The Republic of South Africa views that there is a need for better transparency in order to make the process of verification of disarmament more reliable. South Africa favors the process of working through the United Nations to ensure that states submit their individual reports on their nuclear materials on a regular basis. South Africa favors issuing greater resources to the International Atomic Energy Agency to make the inspection more effectively and reliable.

Sources:
https://unidir.org/files/publication/pdfs/coming-to-terms-with-security-a-handbook-on-verification-and-compliance-en-554.pdf
https://www.iaea.org/topics/non-proliferation-treaty
https://www.rusi.org/networks/uk-poni/nuclear-reactions/disarmament-and-non-proliferation-verification
https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/Amorim%20Report.htm
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005-09/looking-back-un-monitoring-verification-and-inspection-commission
https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/south-africa-nuclear-disarmament/
https://www.icanw.org/south_africa_from_nuclear_armed_state_to_disarmament_hero https://education.cfr.org/learn/reading/south-africa-why-countries-acquire-and-abandon-nuclear-bombs
https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/disarmament
https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/who-we-are/about-unoda

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Ukraine
Delegate Name: Nidha Fathima Abdul Malik

Verification is one of the most important parts of disarmament. It means checking that countries have actually reduced or eliminated their weapons instead of secretly keeping them. Verification helps build trust between states and prevents cheating. It applies to many types of weapons, including nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional arms. Without strong verification systems, disarmament agreements lose credibility and countries may begin to distrust one another. When trust breaks down, arms races and conflict can follow.

Ukraine strongly supports reliable and effective verification mechanisms. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to give up these weapons under the Budapest Memorandum in exchange for security assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. Ukraine fulfilled its obligations, and its nuclear disarmament was verified. However, violations of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in later years have raised serious concerns about the strength of security assurances and enforcement mechanisms. This experience has shaped Ukraine’s view that verification alone is not enough; disarmament must also be backed by accountability and real consequences for violations.

Ukraine calls on the United Nations to strengthen international verification systems by improving inspection procedures, increasing transparency, and supporting independent monitoring organizations. Ukraine believes verification processes must be clear, professional, and protected from political interference. At the same time, the international community must ensure that when states violate disarmament commitments or security assurances, there are meaningful consequences. By strengthening both verification and accountability, the United Nations can restore trust in disarmament agreements and promote long-term international security.

Sources:
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Disarmament Documents Library: Reports and Resources. United Nations, https://disarmament.unoda.org/publications/library/61-ga-sg-report/?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 15 Feb. 2026.

International Atomic Energy Agency. Safeguards and Verification. IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-and-verification?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 15 Feb. 2026.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Verification Division. OPCW, https://www.opcw.org/about/technical-secretariat/divisions/verification?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 15 Feb. 2026.

Budjeryn, Mariana, and Matthew Bunn. Budapest Memorandum at 25: Between Past and Future. Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Mar. 2020, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/budapest-memorandum-25-between-past-and-future. Accessed 15 Feb. 2026. (Belfer Center)

Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 15 Feb. 2026. (Wikipedia)

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Somalia
Delegate Name: Eleanor Margolis

Somalia finds that verifying that a country has disarmed is important for the safety of countries across the globe.

Verifying that countries are controlling and reducing their inventory of dangerous weapons is very important. Some countries, including Somalia, have bilateral agreements on this topic, but when tensions are thick, these agreements are easily revoked, which is obviously a problem. The UN is already working with many other independent organizations, but the concern of bringing in outside organizations to check if countries are disarming is large, based on the trust that is easily broken.

Somalia signed onto a bilateral agreement on this topic called CTBT. Somalia has also worked with the UN to create a Joint Verification Team. This team checks weapons and ammunition stockpiles and compares them to records. These checks help to create Somalia safer. Somalia finds that this topic is important, for Somalia believes in the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons.

Somalia wants to work together with the other delegates to come up with an agreeable solution where countries are safe from the danger of weapons of mass destruction by making sure that the number of dangerous weapons is reduced and ultimately eliminated. A suggestible idea for this could be for a binding agreement between countries where each country agrees to disclose the existence of weapons and disarm themselves no matter what is going on between the countries. Peace can be created through collective action that reduces the number of dangerous weapons.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Republic of Korea
Delegate Name: Anish Kulkarni

Committee: Disarmament and International Security Committee
Topic: Verification of Disarmament
Country: Republic of Korea
Delegate Name: Anish Kulkarni

The effectiveness of disarmament efforts fundamentally stem from credible verification. Without reliable verification mechanisms, treaties risk becoming symbols rather than enforcers. International Disarmament verification strengthens confidence, deters covert weaponry programs, and prevents arms races. The Republic of Korea, however, has seen existing mechanisms that conduct safeguards like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) already provide verification in this politically sensitive environment. Further bilateral agreements like the New START Treaty further illustrate how on-site inspections, data exchanges, and national cooperation can provide transparency between strategic competitors. However, when trust deteriorates, when international organizations fail, and geopolitical tensions rise, verification is the first mechanism to collapse, undermining disarmament efforts.

For the Republic of Korea, verification is not an abstract concept, rather a matter of immediate national security. The Korean Peninsula remains as one of the world’s most militarized regions, and the failure of past diplomatic efforts towards nuclear disarmament has demonstrated the importance of verification. The suspension of inspection in international cases, including the disruptions in cooperation with the IAEA, highlights the fragility of trust when verification is compromised. As seen with volatile regional states the erosion of verification mechanism leads to renewed weapons development, increased uncertainty, and heightened tensions. Thus, the Republic of Korea supports further international safeguards under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including a universal adoption of the Additional Protocol (AP) to allow expanded transparency for undeclared nuclear sites.

The Republic of Korea also recognizes that verification challenges extend beyond nuclear weapons. While the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) benefits from a highly structured inspection regime, other conventions for weapons of mass destruction, such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), lack binding verification mechanisms, creating a gap for the goal of global disarmament. These conventional weapons and missile systems present additional difficulties as their production capacity and storage can be concealed within industrial civilian infrastructure. In a region where the Republic of Korea has seen active missile testing which could directly impact civilian populations, trans[arent reporting and notification mechanisms are essential for stability.

Drawing from regional experience, the Republic of Korea proposes 3 targeted initiatives to this committee that will improve the verification of disarmament globally. First is to establish a Verification Support Framework that would help prepare technical infrastructure and supply trained personnel for rapid deployment through the Verification Research, Training and Informative Centre (VERTIC) in the event of a future nuclear disarmament agreement. The Republic of Korea believes that this framework should coordinate with the IAEA and relevant UN bodies while still ensuring regional participation. Second, the Republic of Korea supports the creation of regional risk reduction mechanisms including annual transparency dialogues, military hotlines and notification of missile or conventional arms testing to prevent miscalculation and increase transparency. Lastly the Republic of Korea advocates the design for a Technology and Data Verification Initiative to strengthen confidence in inspection processes and prevent disruptions that undermine cooperation. This initiative would promote the use of standardized cybersecurity protocols for inspection technologies and data-sharing platforms to ensure verification data is accurate as well as being protected from manipulation. The Republic of Korea believes that integrating these three policy initiatives into a resolution would sustain long-term compliance and stability of disarmament agreements in the future.

The Republic of Korea remains committed to finding a pragmatic approach that balances credible verification with sovereignty, responsible technology leadership, and multilateral cooperation for all of the international community.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Peru
Delegate Name: Chloe Chung

The United Nations verifies disarmament by confirming that a state is complying with disarmament agreements, reducing and eliminating their weapons supply instead of developing it. Verification of disarmament mainly affects national governments, but also the global population by improving overall stability and trust. This takes place universally with major centers located mainly in Europe. Geneva, Switzerland is home to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) that serves as a hub for arms control and disarmament negotiations. Vienna, Austria is home to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that monitors international cooperation in arms reduction. Despite these programs in place, verification of disarmament proves a prominent challenge due to mistrust between nations. Many view inspections as intrusive, causing clashes with national sovereignty. Monitoring disarmament is very difficult technically and requires substantial funding and resources. Overall, this is a multifaceted issue with challenges that are logistical, political, and technical.

Globally, there have been steps taken to try and fix this problem such as through global treaties like the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This builds off of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and utilizes the IAEA to verify the physical elimination of such weapons and their programs. The UN has also started programs such as the Vertical Research, Training and Information Center (VERTIC) that research and publish their findings on verification regimes worldwide. However, due to past instances of foul play and tampering, many countries have become hesitant to allow this, dismantling the entire verification process.

Peru maintains a strong stance in favor of global disarmament. Rather than just military, Peru focuses on the human impact of nuclear weapons, stating that they cause catastrophic impacts on citizens and should be prohibited completely. From this stance, treaties such as the TPNW were adopted for the reason of its commitment to international human rights, stating that it “is in line with Peru’s commitment to promoting international peace and security to facilitate the development and growth of our peoples”. (Press statement 2020). Being a member of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, (Tlaltelolco), Peru is a nuclear-weapon-free-zone. Peru supports international corporations such as the IAEA to monitor and confirm the destruction of military arsenals. Through collaboration with the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) numerous programs have been started to help Peruvian armed forces in safely managing their weapons to protect citizens from harm.

The delegation of Peru fully believes that transparency is the key to verification of disarmament. Currently, difficulties in this subject are due to lack of trust, but by utilizing neutral programs, trust between countries can be built back up. This entails submitting reports determining the absence of military arsenal through the UN, further supporting IAEA Additional Protocol. Peru also suggests that International Monitoring Systems (IMS) be implemented around the world to further hold countries accountable to dispose of their chemical and biological weapons. In summary, Peru requests for the support of UN-backed initiatives for worldwide disarmament.

Sources Used:
https://www.vertic.org/
https://www.icanw.org/how_is_the_ban_treaty_verifiable
https://unidir.org/focus-area/disarmament-fora/
https://www.icanw.org/peru#:~:text=Photo:%20ICAN-,National%20position,to%20the%20TPNW%20in%202022.
https://www.iaea.org/bulletin/the-npt-and-iaea-safeguards
https://www.npaid.org/mine-action-and-disarmament/where-we-work/peru#:~:text=This%20project%20aims%20to%20strengthen,in%20the%20Peruvian%20Armed%20Forces.
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-05/features/addressing-verification-nuclear-ban-treaty#:~:text=The%20International%20Atomic%20Energy%20Agency,into%20pursuant%20to%20such%20policies.%22

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Sudan
Delegate Name: Anna Behrens

Verification is the process of checking if a state, who claimed to have disarmed their weapons, did disarm their weapons. This applies to biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. In addition to those it also applies to weapons that are easier to conceal such as missiles,guns, and aircraft. Trust is essential to verification and verification is essential to disarmament. But trust is fragile and so are verification agreements when that trust is broken. In 2010, a verification inspector from IAEA put an infected USB drive into an Iranian nuclear enrichment facility. This damaged and disabled computers controlling centrifuges. That incident also ended verification in Iran. But verification can also be successful, like the United States of America and Russia’s START treaties that enable each other to verify each other’s facilities. Verification and Disarmament affects all nations with militaries, but impacts countries with weapons of mass destruction the most. Most recently, regarding verification of disarmament, the UN passed resolution A/C.1/80/L.59, which established a group of scientific and technological experts on nuclear disarmament verification.
Sudan agreed to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 that established verification due to the previous conflict Sudan was involved in. Sudan is involved in other verification programs, the CPA is just one verification program Sudan is a part of. Sudan has signed and ratified agreements on verification of disarmament such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Going forward Sudan hopes to create more international verification of disarmament resolutions and agreements.
Sudan is largely a supporter of international verification of disarmament agreements. Sudan plans to work with other nations on an agreement, like such. Sudan is hesitant about verification agreements regarding their internal conflicts from external nations or organizations. Sudan will be more cautious regarding resolutions such as those. Sudan firmly believes that in order to achieve peace from a verification of disarmament agreement, rebel groups should also get verified. Sudan suggests that DISEC members work together to create resolutions that strengthen verification of disarmament internationally with a clear framework for doing so. In conclusion, Sudan will be hesitant to support certain resolutions regarding verification of disarmament over internal affairs from external parties, but will be a strong supporter of binding, international verification of disarmament resolutions that include more established rebel groups.

Works Cited
“Document Viewer.” Un.org, 2025, docs.un.org/en/A/RES/71/67.
“SECURITY COUNCIL DECLARES INTENTION to CONSIDER SANCTIONS to OBTAIN SUDAN’S FULL COMPLIANCE with SECURITY, DISARMAMENT OBLIGATIONS on DARFUR | UN Press.” Press.un.org, press.un.org/en/2004/sc8191.doc.htm.
“Sudan Sets Rebel Disarmament as Condition for Ending 20-Month Civil War – Türkiye Today.” Türkiye Today, 7 Dec. 2025, www.turkiyetoday.com/world/sudan-sets-rebel-disarmament-as-condition-for-ending-20-month-civil-war-3210965?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 13 Feb. 2026.
“Sudan Signs and Ratifies the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty.” CTBTO, 2026, www.ctbto.org/resources/for-the-media/press-releases/sudan-signs-and-ratifies-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 13 Feb. 2026.
“Sudan Signs the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons | United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.” Unoda.org, 2025, disarmament.unoda.org/en/spotlights/sudan-signs-treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 13 Feb. 2026.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Iran
Delegate Name: Allie Costa

SIMUN 2026

Committee: DISEC

Delegation: Iran

Verification of Disarmament

The Disarmament and International Security Committee’s key role is regulating arms and promoting cooperation, which is why verifying when a State has been disarmed is especially important. This is important for all possible life-threatening ordeals like missiles, chemical weapons, and nuclear arms, and verification allows nations to be confident about the disarmament process and their own safety. Without verification, we will have no clue whether a country is lying about being disarmed, or whether they misunderstood the process. Many verification agreements involve other parties inspecting a delegation’s inventory, the United States and Russia do this. One party conducts surveillance flights over facilities, making sure that the other party is following the treaty. However, if tensions were to rise, agreements like the one between the United States and Russia can be revoked. The United Nations as a whole works with independent organizations to teach groups how to verify disarmament. Although the groups are independent, some nations are wary of allowing outside parties to inspect facilities, which is an obvious concern. There are many situations where when someone is verifying, they mess up the process or negatively inflict on the nation’s sovereignty. The trust needed between parties to conduct an in-person inspection is easily broken. And when the trust in the verification system is broken, the disarmament system becomes broken.

As the Delegation of Iran, we have been personally attacked while under an inspection. In 2010, a USB was put into the Iranian nuclear enrichment facility during an inspection, this caused the computers controlling the centrifuges to disable and damage the machines. How can nations trust the inspection process when situations like this happen? Because of this situation, Iran has stopped allowing IAEA inspections into the facilities. The delegation of Iran understands the need for verification, all nations want is for their country to be safe, however we must go about it properly and fairly. Infringing on another nation’s sovereignty by corrupting their facilities is dangerous and wrong. Any effect on dangerous machinery could cause more harm than good, even if it were performed with good intentions.

For nations like the Delegation of Iran to respect and trust the verification system, there must be mutual respect. The Delegation of Iran proposes that we create an organization called, RVP, Respecting the Verification Process. This organization will be comprised of those who already have experience in verification, and they will be teaching other countries how to respectfully verify. An example is teaching a group how to know when enforcing something is infringing on sovereignty and when it is not, as well as teaching people how to safely identify and disarm something. We will provide examples of what to identify, as well as guidelines on how to verify. These guidelines will ensure that the arms are completely destroyed, and how to destroy them. Countries will have to sign off on the process, promising that they will comply and work with those who are verifying. All these aspects can be used to teach nations how to respect and have faith in the verification systems. Once both parties respect each other, verifications can get done much quicker, not having to risk breaking an agreement over a miscommunication.

Work Cited

GRCityDelegates, and Gregory Poole. “Verification of Disarmament .” GLICA.Org, GLICA.org, 5 Feb. 2026, glica.org/simun/committees/disec-verification/. 

Treacy, Stephen. “The Story of the Secret Cyber Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Sites.” RTE.Ie, RTÉ, 24 June 2025, www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2025/0624/1520026-iran-nuclear-power-stuxnet-cyberattack/. 

“Verification in All Its Aspects :” United Nations, United Nations, digitallibrary.un.org/record/192729?v=pdf. Accessed 9 Feb. 2026. 

“The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre.” VERTIC, 1 Dec. 2025, www.vertic.org/. 

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Gabon
Delegate Name: Abigail Kearney

The United Nations was founded upon a core tenant of disarmament. It is an acceptance of peace and a willful invitation towards cooperation. However, failures to properly verify disarmament in nations leads to borders filled with distrust and disingenuity. The United Nations has developed programs to aid nations in verification of their disarmament, but almost always does so through outside organizations. This means that if nations wish to utilize such programs, they must allow domestically unvetted and potentially untrusted groups into their borders and provide them access to highly sensitive information and facilities. This presents a major obstacle towards verification of disarmament.
The solution Gabon proposes works on a more regional and connected level than current systems. Many nations involve themselves not only in United Nations affiliations, but also more regional organizations such as the African Union and CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States). These organizations work with nations on a much more personal level than the United Nations does due to size and localization. It would be much more beneficial for the United Nations to offer resources that allowed regional organizations to verify disarmament instead of attempting to conduct verification through non-regional, external outside groups. This adds an element of trust and transparency to the verification process that only organizations built around countries in that region can provide.
Current proposals and programs designed to aid nations in verification of disarmament are failing. They are imbued with distrust and inefficiency. Resources that could be used effectively instead go to support programs that lack the widespread acceptance to make them truly useful. Gabon proposes a solution that is built around the countries it holds obligations to, instead of external groups that act as threatening and foreign. A changed utilization of UN resources funneled towards regional managing organizations is the best way to move forward and protect global stability.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Lebanon
Delegate Name: Alveera Poptani

Verification of Disarmament: The technical process of making sure states comply with arms reduction utilizing on-site inspections, environmental sampling, remote sensing, etc. to confirm the reduction or elimination of weapons. Lebanon approaches this issue with an understanding of the consequences of unchecked weapons proliferation. Through civil war, foreign occupation, and ongoing regional instability, Lebanon recognizes that effective verification mechanisms are essential to preventing armed conflict and preserving peace.
The Lebanese government officially wishes to enforce the UN Security Council Resolution 1701; which prohibits all armed militias anywhere in Lebanon. One such of these militias is Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Lebanese political party that opposes Israel. Under President Joseph Aoun, Lebanon has pushed for the disarmament of Hezbollah and other militias for through this Lebanon will regain its national sovereignty and control over weapon circulation.
However, one conflict that Lebanon currently faces in its effort to disarm Hezzabollah is the massive support it has both in and outside of Lebanon with the Shia community and Iran on the political party’s side. But, the biggest reason why Hezbollah stays armed is because it is Lebanon’s greatest line of defense against the looming threat of Israel and could potentially result in a civil war.
Which is why Lebanon takes the stance that if the UN wishes to disarm a group or militia in a certain country, they must take measures to make sure that the disarmament will not leave lasting effects on the country, whether it be in their military power or their national security. Lebanon also emphasizes that verification must be done with respect. It should be impartial and respectful of state sovereignty, rejecting verifications being used as a political pressure or a way to target developing nations.

Sources
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/lebanons-outlook-sovereignty-disarmament-and-peace-discussion-foreign-minister
https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/10/1155221

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: France
Delegate Name: Rocco Brown

Being the ultimate goal of DISEC, disarmament is a key principle that this committee must be able to secure. While only half a percentage of countries may have weapons of mass destruction, any amount, no matter how small, could cause catastrophic damage (Floyd). As one of these countries, the Delegation of France believes in disarmament; the nature of this disarmament must be proven to be factual. Since 2008, France has had a cap on nuclear weapons, being verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Agency (Ministère). It is through cooperation that the delegation achieves safe and secure verification. The issue lies in that while verification does exist, it is usually fragmented into numerous treaties, with only the nations as a part of these agreements being the verifiers. It needs to be achieved through an established objective, a united effort, so that verification can be ensured.
Multilateral nonproliferation agreements are under threat. As geopolitical tensions rise, nations have continued to undermine norms and verification measures. Additionally, emerging technologies threaten to exploit verification loopholes and lower barriers to weapon production (Brashears). Countries also have subtle agendas to thwart attempts to reach consensus. For example, Russia used its veto authority within the UN Security Council in 2017 to curtail the tenure of the investigative team responsible for attributing the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War (Brashears). With so much uncertainty at play, it is clear the UN must find a way to ensure that countries are being truthful, with no foul play.
The Delegation of France believes this issue must be solved through accountability and checks and balances to ensure countries aren’t abusing their powers to hinder this goal. By proposing the United Nations Verification Task Force (UNVTF), the Delegation of France believes that the validity of verification can be accomplished through this objective body. Through the Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission, the Delegation of France has established 16 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaties in French territories, which ban all use of nuclear weapons for civilian and military uses (Ministère). The delegation believes that expanding programs like these helps aid this committee’s goal of disarmament. This body, consisting of UN-approved auditors, these workers will go into countries claiming disarmament (with their consent) in order to prove that disarmament has truly occurred and additionally establish further disarmament treaties internally and externally. Finally, the delegation of France believes that the International Court of Justice must investigate and prosecute any countries that try to interfere with UN investigations, such as what was mentioned with Russia in 2017. All of us must be held accountable in order to achieve this. Only through cooperation can this body achieve the goals of what DISEC has sought to do.
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Work Cited:

Brashears, Sydney. Verification at Risk: Examining Growing Challenges to Verify, cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2025-03/verification-at-risk.pdf. Accessed 10 Feb. 2026.

Floyd. “The Countries Expanding Their Nuclear Arsenal.” BLACKSEA CASPIA, blacksea-caspia.eu/en/countries-expanding-their-nuclear-arsenal. Accessed 9 Feb. 2026.

Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères. “Nuclear Disarmament.” France Diplomacy – Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/nuclear-disarmament/. Accessed 12 Feb. 2026.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Belarus
Delegate Name: Sofia Bontomasi

The Republic of Belarus believes that verification of disarmament is an important matter that must gain consent from individual countries in order to uphold national sovereignty in order to protect sensitive national security information yet still foster a community of peace.
One key position Belarus holds regarding the verification of disarmament is the importance of transparency balanced with national sovereignty. This is mainly demonstrated through Belarus’s support for internationally recognized verification mechanisms that operate under mutual consent and established legal frameworks, such as UN-led or treaty-based verification processes. In this case, transparency serves as the tool that builds trust between states while respecting their right to control sensitive security information. Belarus believes verification should enhance confidence and stability rather than be used to exert political pressure, and therefore emphasizes cooperation and equal treatment of all participating states in verification regimes.
Another position Belarus emphasizes is the need for non-discriminatory and universally applied verification standards. This is seen through Belarus’s support for multilateral disarmament agreements where all parties are subject to the same rules, obligations, and inspection procedures. In this example, fairness is the motivating factor. Belarus argues that selective or unequal verification undermines trust and discourages participation in disarmament efforts. States are more likely to comply when verification mechanisms are applied evenly and are not influenced by political bias or power dynamics. As a result, Belarus advocates for verification systems that are transparent, impartial, and collectively agreed upon within the United Nations.
A final position Belarus takes is that effective verification must be paired with dialogue and confidence-building measures. This is mainly demonstrated through Belarus’s support for information sharing, reporting mechanisms, and diplomatic engagement alongside technical verification tools. In this case, cooperation is the driving principle. Belarus views verification not as an end in itself, but as part of a broader process aimed at reducing mistrust and preventing conflict. In contrast, verification measures that are imposed without dialogue are seen as confrontational and counterproductive. Belarus therefore supports verification of disarmament that strengthens international cooperation and contributes to long-term global and regional security.
Belarus believes that in order to foster international cooperation transparency is key; however, this must be balanced with respect for national sovereignty. Dialogue is also the best method of assuring compliance as forced verification is aggressive and harmful. Thus when discussing methods of verification, it is important to keep these conditions in mind.

Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Denmark
Delegate Name: Elouise Kampfschulte-Geary

Committee: Disarmament & International Security Committee
Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Denmark
Delegate name: Elouise Kampfschulte-Geary

Denmark, along with many other European countries, strives for a world completely free from nuclear weapons. Denmark does not hold any nuclear weapons and pushes for thorough verification of arms, and does so with on-site inspections, remote monitoring, and other technical and collaborative methods. Being one of many States in the UN who do not house any nuclear, chemical, or biological arms, Denmark openly encourages and contributes to maintaining international peace and security, protection of civilians, and the building of trust among States.

Since the end of World War II, Denmark has been committed to developing strategic and stable security systems and regulating weapons deemed as inhumane. Denmark is a member of NATO and IPNDV (International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification), and prioritizes upholding international law. Denmark’s NATO obligation often results in aligning with countries who do possess nuclear weapons, whom they rely on for security, such as the U.S., who has not signed the TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) initiative and has pressured Denmark into following suit. Although foreign pressure prevents their support for a complete ban over nuclear arms, Denmark still complies with other disarmament initiatives such as GSTE-NDV.

Denmark wishes to uphold international security, law, and trust through a resolution that effectively states verification of disarmament processes and options, unique to each State. Denmark recognizes the rising tension and geopolitical challenges currently. Moving forward, Denmark wishes for a world with compliance and not destruction.

Position papers for SIMUN 2026 will appear above this line, with the newest being at the top.