Topic: 2024-The Situatin in the South China Sea
Country: China
Delegate Name: Nathaniel Jernberg-Johnson
Despite the passing of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of The Sea (UNCLOS), member states of the UN are still navigating the nuanced struggles of agreed borders in the South China Sea. One major issue is the disconnect between China’s sacrosanct “9-Dash Line” island claims, and the UNCLOS map drawn to delineate Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of China and ASEAN countries within the South China Sea. China’s 9-Dash Line encompasses the waters surrounding the Nansha (Spratly) and Xisha (Paracel) islands. Historians and journalists agree that these islands were explored and named by China as early as the 11th century— from hence, the surrounding waters were largely considered Chinese territory, and continue to be treated as such. In a 2016 decision, after an arbitration presented unilaterally by the Phillipines and held without China (under Annex VII of UNCLOS, which unjustly permits such action) The Permanent Court Of Arbitration (PCA) ruled that much of China’s “9-Dash Line —” was not legal under international law. The PCA’s Tribunal conceded that “it does not rule on any question of sovereignty over land territory and does not delimit any boundary between the Parties.”
China already anticipated this insensitive perspective from the PCA years prior: in a December 2014 position paper, the Chinese government emphasized the sheer injustice of even considering reducing the 9-Dash Line. Crucially, the arguments made to “discredit” China’s claims in favor of the 9-Dash Line were not fact-based. As the Tribunal mentioned in its decision, Articles 13 and 121 of UNCLOS entitled “at least a 12 nautical mile territorial sea” to the owner of any maritime feature which does not become submerged at high tide (a “high-tide feature”). The Tribunal counterintuitively concluded that 4 Chinese islands — which did not become submerged at high tide — did not legally count as “high-tide features” under UNCLOS. Furthermore, despite the Tribunal’s criticism towards China’s defensive action to repel vessels from Chinese waters, China’s action is supported by UNCLOS itself. Article 19, Clause 1 explains that the “innocent passage” many nations claim is only innocent if it “is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State,” thus affirming China’s right to self-defence against perceived threats.
In fact, China continues to make clear its benign intentions for ocean development and regulation; as of Nov 26, 2024, H.E. Wang Yi, Director of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), stated that China immensely values lasting “maritime peace and stability,” and that China is “ready to work with all countries to pursue higher-level ocean governance.” Wang outlined China’s earnest goals to maintain maritime peace and security in compliance with UNCLOS and the Declaration on the Conduct Of Parties in the South China Sea.
China is more than willing to regard other nations’ perspectives on this matter, but will not compromise on its 9-Dash Line claim under any circumstances — the historical precedent reinforces that any alternative would be a clear violation of our national and cultural sovereignty. As we realize that UNCLOS cannot be amended without total unanimity among member states, we see only one solution for this committee to truly ensure a lasting peace in the South China Sea: to draft a resolution which codifies the 9-Dash Line as a de facto EEZ. While ensuring that all nations still are able to enshrine their right to innocent passage for non-economic reasons and cultural exchange, this solution will right an injustice that has lasted nearly half a century.
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