Topic: 2024-The Situation in Rwanda
Country: China
Delegate Name: Nathaniel Jernberg-Johnson
As the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has insisted for years, unpopular peacekeeping forces have inadvertently worsened some of the DRC’s internal and external conflicts. So, in a unanimous December 2023 vote, the UN Security Council (UNSC) agreed that by the end of 2024 (at the latest), all peacekeeping forces will be withdrawn from the DRC, including those of MONUSCO and the SAMIDRC. This transition has already begun: since June 25, 2024, MONUSCO has not been present in the South Kivu region. Bintou Keita, head of MONUSCO, expressed graciousness for the Chinese peacekeeping contingent’s parting gift of engineering tools and medical equipment, emphasizing that in the absence of peacekeepers in the DRC, such supports for infrastructure are “crucial […] in maintaining and consolidating peace and security.” Since then, the withdrawal has seen steady success — an indefinite ceasefire is still in effect, and diplomatic negotiations between the two States have progressed towards a nigh-inevitable agreement to “neutralize the FLDR” and “disengage” M23–Rwandan forces.
Even beyond the scope of the conflict, China’s investment-based economic strategy has been an instrumental force in the sustainable development of Rwanda and the DRC. Professor Pacifique Malanga (former Rwanda chief of state protocol, and ex-advisor to the UNHCR chief of mission in Rwanda) wrote in an opinion article in 2021 that Chinese programs such as the Belt and Road initiative and Huawei’s Seeds for the Future project have been invaluable for Rwandan economic modernization and development. Our relationship with the DRC is built on the same principle of “win-win” investment: in his 2016 paper on China-DRC relations, director of Southern Africa Resources Watch Claude Kabemba, concluded that “there is no doubt that China and the DRC are [both] benefitting from established commercial relations.” Kabemba, often a critic of China, still admitted that China’s investment strategies prioritize “mutual benefit and win-win outcomes at the continental and bilateral levels,” in contrast to Western strategies of using foreign investment as their incentive to hegemonically “[impose] Western democratic values in Africa.”
In any resolution that is to pass, we should commend the current upholding of the June ceasefire, and encourage continuation of the ongoing meetings between both nations, to agree on a solution capable of eliminating the threats to peace posed by the FLDR and M23. However, a very recent French summit’s attempt at 3-way talks fell apart (French president Emmanuel Macron remarked that “the situation is still too tense”). To allow these tensions to ease, China suggests a more bilateral strategy, modeled on President Xi’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), which succeeded in restoring diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023. A UNSC member state speaking on the body’s behalf, (e.g. France), would host one-on-one dialogues with Rwanda, and separately with the DRC, until an agreement is reached or tensions lower to the point where a 3-way meeting becomes possible. Furthermore, several studies by groups such as the International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health and the Barcelona Institute of Economics find that the increased presence of parks and green spaces in cities can greatly reduce rates of crime and violence. To translate this promising information into action, this body should outline goals for the UNGA and ECOSOC to incentivize state and non-state actors to invest in sustainable development projects in Rwanda and the DRC. Ultimately, this pairing of pragmatic diplomacy and economic investment will improve quality of life and economic opportunity while also curtailing future violence.
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