Topic: 2025 – Responsibility of International Organizations
Country: China
Delegate Name: Owen Hufnagel
Legal Committee
Responsibility of International Organizations
People’s Republic of China
Owen Hufnagel
Forest Hills Eastern
The People’s Republic of China increasingly recognizes the need to establish international organizational (IO) responsibility, given the growing IO activity in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, development, and economic governance. Thus, where bacteria and disease spread from peacekeeping missions, where global poverty arises through international lending agencies, and where civilian casualties are unfortunately part of a globalized military enterprise, there is a legitimate purpose for responsibility given international concern. Yet at the same time, China believes that IOs that necessarily operate within the parameters set by the United Nations and similar programs have power and capability through state action, and that IOs exist to foster stability and cohesion. Therefore, the international level of responsibility should be established through practical application that clarifies what responsibility looks like, while ultimately maintaining the IOs’ ability to operate successfully and effectively help people. Thus, China recognizes the International Law Commission’s 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (the ILC) as appropriate for this level of consideration, but acknowledges that the articles are non-binding recommendations that should be approached with caution and consideration of differences between Organizations and state sovereignty.
China believes that responsibility must respect the IO structure, with restricted personnel and specific mandates, rather than mirroring state responsibility. For example, IOs, their mandates, and their member state composition mean that IOs are not one-size-fits-all. While certain members are part of the IO and call upon IO action (as States would to a State entity), sometimes the member states assign responsibility. Thus, when wrongdoing occurs, responsibility must be assessed in light of the intention behind the action. Was it part of a mandate that went wrong? An assembly decision? An intentional choice made by someone doing something in their capacity? China does not want the blame to fall on the IO as an entity first, as it might in some contexts. Instead, states might have given permission (for peacekeeping efforts) or control (for coalition warfare efforts), and thus, IO responsibilities are subordinate to state citizens and should remain above the IO. In addition, China believes that responsibility should not infringe on the IO’s operational independence established by international law. For example, peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts have extensive operational rights and specific immunities that are sometimes rigid enough to provide safe passage. Suppose responsibility is too vast and covers IOs indiscriminately. In that case, states might flinch from delivering troops, time, and expertise in times of great need, as was the case in many humanitarian missions following certain natural disasters.
Going forward, China welcomes reforms that promote transparency, oversight, and recourse without diminishing operational efficiency. For example, improvements should be made through recommendations for better cooperation between the United Nations and regional agencies, improved reporting, joint investigations, and for those acting under authority, meaning IO authority should be returned to national jurisdiction. China promotes non-judicial means: independent review boards, claims boards, and internal investigations as means to endorse justice for those who were victims of wrongdoing, but not view IOs as adversaries. Finally, China believes that any recourse assessed should be established over time through a deliberative process with the UN Legal Committee, which supports state consent and avoids politicization. The more oversight there is, with appropriate levels of responsibility and accountability, the more responsibility can be avoided without sacrificing IOs’ ability to foster peace, stability, and development internationally.
