Topic: 2025 – Situation in Mali
Country: Panama
Delegate Name: Vincent DelRosso
Country: Delegation of Panama
Committee: United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Topic: Situation in Mali
Since 2012, the situation in Mali, also called the Mali War, has descended into a multi-lateral conflict that has seen several factions and foreign forms of intervention. The three main factions outlined in this conflict consist of the Malian government, jihad extremists, and the Tuareg ethnic group. The most recent movement within this conflict came in June of 2023 in which United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping forces put in place through the works of the UNSC in 2014 were withdrawn from Mali. This departure was an inevitable result stemming from years of rhetoric growing disdainful to the 2015 Algiers Accords, the now antiquated peace terms. (Northern) The government of Mali has found itself in essentially a military dictatorship, through the leadership of the Junta. Without the help of peacekeeping, the Malian government has called upon the Russian-based private military contractor, the Wagner Group. The concerns revolving around using the Wagner Group (Rebranded to Africa Corps) come down to the dangers posed to civilians. War already poses a plethora of civilian dangers, yet those dangers grow exponentially with the use of unregulated private military contractors, such as Africa Corps. (ADF) The Enlistment of Africa Corps is intended to combat rebellion from the two major factions in this war. The first of which is ethnic group of nomadic peoples have found themselves designating most of Northern Mali. The Tuareg people have found themselves united in Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA). The second main opposition to Mali art the jihad extremists in this region, the regional affiliate to the terrorist organization of Al-Queda.
The Delegation of Panama is deeply concerned with much of the geopolitical turmoil within this region and prioritize the gradual regression of tensions between opposing factions. Taking a broader view of this conflict in specific, much of this instability stems from deep roots in imperialism that has occurred within this past century. While Panama is no stranger to imperialism, Panama and Mali did not have the same interaction with the beast that was imperialism, yet both nations have been affected by the long-term consequences of the ideology. As with Panama, Mali has a deep history with an imperial power exploiting the region for natural resources. Though not necessarily through the same means, Panama and Mali both have had some extended form of dependency on a larger power. So, in 2022 when the French Army was discharged from Mali, the Delegation of Panama understands power vacuum that was left behind. Thus, it is to no surprise that the Malian government enlisted help from the Russian-based Wagner Group/Africa Corps to fill the void of power. With this understanding, the Panamanian delegation takes a true neutral stance on the conflict, understanding both the political instability within Mali, and the opposing interest of the Tuareg peoples alongside the Jihadist Muslims.
As for possible solutions for this incredibly complex conflict, the struggle of maintaining neutrality and providing safety for all those involved, especially civilians caught in the crossfire is paramount. The priority of this council should be to primarily protect the civilians who are being harmed despite limited involvement. To protect civilians, the Delegation of Panama frowns upon the concept of peacekeeping operations. The modern operational capacities of UN peacekeeping mandates must be reworked prior to any more exposition. Conceptually, enlisting soldiers to solve inner conflicts that hail from counties that more often than not are already facing their own issues, whilst being funded through western money is a flawed system. Let alone the prior peacekeeping operation within the Mali War did very little to de-escalate the conflict, rather escalated the conflict through the UNSC’s continual expansion on the peacekeeping mandate. (Snyman) Instead, the best possible solution for this conflict would be to arrange for a ceasefire between the Malians and Tuaregs. While taking gradual steps toward the ceasefire, through sanctions on Mali, limiting the support of the Wagner group, etc., the UN should facilitate a ceasefire between the two groups that would ultimately result in a demilitarized zone between the two groups. As for the Jihad Muslims, a separate problem altogether, we as a body will have to see if the issue of this group persists after the incorporation of the demilitarized zone.
ADF. “Tuareg Coalition Threatens Continued Instability in Northern Mali.” Africa Defense Forum, ADF, 21 May 2024, adf-magazine.com/2024/05/ tuareg-coalition-threatens-continued-instability-in-northern-mali/. Accessed 19 Nov. 2025.
“Northern Mali: A Conflict with No Victors.” International Crisis Group, 13 Oct. 2023, www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/ nord-du-mali-une-confrontation-dont-personne-ne-sortira-vainqueur. Accessed 19 Nov. 2025.
Snyman, Katelynn. “One Year Later: Lessons From MINUSMA’s Withdrawal from Mali and the Crisis of UN Peacekeeping.” Security Distillery, 28 Sept. 2024, thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/ one-year-later-lessons-from-minusmas-withdrawal-from-mali-and-the-crisis-of-un-peacekeeping#:~:text=T roops%20from%20MINUSMA%20%E2%80%93%20Mission%20Multidimensionnelle,an%20end’%20%5B5%5D.
