Topic: 2026 – Verification of Disarmament
Country: Iran
Delegate Name: Allie Costa
SIMUN 2026
Committee: DISEC
Delegation: Iran
Verification of Disarmament
The Disarmament and International Security Committee’s key role is regulating arms and promoting cooperation, which is why verifying when a State has been disarmed is especially important. This is important for all possible life-threatening ordeals like missiles, chemical weapons, and nuclear arms, and verification allows nations to be confident about the disarmament process and their own safety. Without verification, we will have no clue whether a country is lying about being disarmed, or whether they misunderstood the process. Many verification agreements involve other parties inspecting a delegation’s inventory, the United States and Russia do this. One party conducts surveillance flights over facilities, making sure that the other party is following the treaty. However, if tensions were to rise, agreements like the one between the United States and Russia can be revoked. The United Nations as a whole works with independent organizations to teach groups how to verify disarmament. Although the groups are independent, some nations are wary of allowing outside parties to inspect facilities, which is an obvious concern. There are many situations where when someone is verifying, they mess up the process or negatively inflict on the nation’s sovereignty. The trust needed between parties to conduct an in-person inspection is easily broken. And when the trust in the verification system is broken, the disarmament system becomes broken.
As the Delegation of Iran, we have been personally attacked while under an inspection. In 2010, a USB was put into the Iranian nuclear enrichment facility during an inspection, this caused the computers controlling the centrifuges to disable and damage the machines. How can nations trust the inspection process when situations like this happen? Because of this situation, Iran has stopped allowing IAEA inspections into the facilities. The delegation of Iran understands the need for verification, all nations want is for their country to be safe, however we must go about it properly and fairly. Infringing on another nation’s sovereignty by corrupting their facilities is dangerous and wrong. Any effect on dangerous machinery could cause more harm than good, even if it were performed with good intentions.
For nations like the Delegation of Iran to respect and trust the verification system, there must be mutual respect. The Delegation of Iran proposes that we create an organization called, RVP, Respecting the Verification Process. This organization will be comprised of those who already have experience in verification, and they will be teaching other countries how to respectfully verify. An example is teaching a group how to know when enforcing something is infringing on sovereignty and when it is not, as well as teaching people how to safely identify and disarm something. We will provide examples of what to identify, as well as guidelines on how to verify. These guidelines will ensure that the arms are completely destroyed, and how to destroy them. Countries will have to sign off on the process, promising that they will comply and work with those who are verifying. All these aspects can be used to teach nations how to respect and have faith in the verification systems. Once both parties respect each other, verifications can get done much quicker, not having to risk breaking an agreement over a miscommunication.
Work Cited
GRCityDelegates, and Gregory Poole. “Verification of Disarmament .” GLICA.Org, GLICA.org, 5 Feb. 2026, glica.org/simun/committees/disec-verification/.
Treacy, Stephen. “The Story of the Secret Cyber Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Sites.” RTE.Ie, RTÉ, 24 June 2025, www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2025/0624/1520026-iran-nuclear-power-stuxnet-cyberattack/.
“Verification in All Its Aspects :” United Nations, United Nations, digitallibrary.un.org/record/192729?v=pdf. Accessed 9 Feb. 2026.
“The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre.” VERTIC, 1 Dec. 2025, www.vertic.org/.
