Topic: 2024-Private Military Contractors
Country: China
Delegate Name: Ari Shtein
The United Nations is committed, above all else, to its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Developing countries will only be able to achieve modernization in line with the SDGs if they can maintain stable governance and construct a robust network of infrastructure. China acts as a global leader in achieving the SDGs—between spearheading infrastructure projects and defending government institutions in developing countries, its impact is difficult to overstate. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has invested in more than 150 countries (Curtis and Klaus) and its efforts are projected to raise global yearly GDP more than $7 trillion by 2040 (“Belt and Road Initiative to Boost World GDP”).
Unfortunately, initiatives like the BRI and UN projects in developing countries have repeatedly been threatened by unreliable governments and violent non-state actors (Saltskog and Clarke). In response, a growing number of private military and security companies (PMSCs) have been deployed, primarily in sub-saharan Africa and Southeast Asia (Honrada). Among these companies, the Chinese government wishes to clarify the difference between static security forces and military contractors (Weinbaum): the former are acceptable under Chinese law and must be at least partially state-owned. Importantly, they protect only a specific asset or project. Often, static security forces are totally unarmed and simply advise, train, and support local security forces against threats. Military contractors, by contrast, often act as destabilizing mercenary forces deployed to active combat zones, and serve to carry out a state’s strategic interest covertly, allowing them to maintain deniability and skirt accountability.
This distinction is key and must serve as the basis for any legal framework that wishes to govern PMSCs. While military contractors are often used for legitimate ends, their opacity and lack of accountability is highly concerning. The conduct and resolution of armed conflict is best left up to states and intergovernmental organizations like the UN. However, the protection of infrastructure projects and support for local authorities carried out by static security forces are vital to ensuring sustainable development, and must not be made inaccessible by overbearing regulation. PMSCs with partial state ownership and clear, protection-focused missions like the Hong Kong–based Frontier Services Group (FSG) tend to provide ethical, transparent, and efficient security solutions, and should receive sanction, even encouragement, from this committee.
Works Cited
“Belt and Road Initiative to Boost World GDP by over $7 Trillion per Annum by 2040.” CEBR, 27 May 2019, cebr.com/blogs/belt-and-road-initiative-to-boost-world-gdp-by-over-7-trillion-per-annum-by-2040/.
Curtis, Simon, and Ian Klaus. “The Belt and Road City: Geopolitics, Urbanization, and China’s Search for a New International Order.” JSTOR, Yale University Press, 2024, www.jstor.org/stable/jj.11589102.
Honrada, Gabriel. “China Private Security Companies Making a BRI Killing.” Asia Times, 1 Nov. 2022, asiatimes.com/2022/11/china-private-security-companies-making-a-bri-killing/.
Saltskog, Mollie, and Colin P. Clarke. “The Little-Known Security Gaps in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” RAND Corporation, The National Interest, 18 Feb. 2019, www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2019/02/the-little-known-security-gaps-in-chinas-belt-and-road.html.
Weinbaum, Cortney. “China’s Security Contractors Have Avoided the Fate of Russia’s Military Contractors, so Far.” Rand.org, RealClearDefense, 11 Mar. 2022, www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/03/chinas-security-contractors-have-avoided-the-fate-of.html.
