Topic: Recommendations for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Country: China
Delegate Name: Isabel Ivanescu
School: Roeper School
Forty-four years ago, the world’s powers united to enact the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a document that would protect the world from the most dangerous weapons of all. Twenty-two years ago, they were joined by the two remaining nuclear powers, France and the People’s Republic of China. Today, our great nation is honored to participate in the process of quinquennial review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT, the Treaty).
The People’s Republic of China firmly believes that the NPT continues to serve a vital purpose, and that all articles of the Treaty remain timely and relevant. However, China also believes that with select resolutions the trial intents of the Treaty (i) would be better served, and our world would be made safer. With the intent of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, we must create two new Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and facilitate political situations in which all nations will allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors onto their sovereign territory and political situations in which all nations can become party to the NPT; we must also ensure that non-governmental and terror groups cannot obtain fissile materials. With the intent of promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we must allow Iran to pursue a non-military nuclear program. And with the intent of nuclear disarmament, we must let the nations with the largest nuclear arsenals lead, and negotiate with those nations least inclined towards disarmament. In addition, we must take measures to establish an international protocol for the safe disposal of nuclear materials and the discharging of outdated and hazardous nuclear power plants.
The first and foremost course of action in achieving the safety of our societies is the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. China believes that the most important way to facilitate this course is to establish further Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs), in the Middle East (ii) and in South Asia.
The first of these proposed zones would encompass the Lebanese Republic, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Republic of Iraq, the Republic of Yemen, the Sultanate of Oman, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In the interest of a fully nuclear-weapon-free Middle East, China also requests that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization withdraw any missiles they are currently depositing in the Republic of Turkey, so that the Republic of Turkey, too, may join a Middle East NWFZ. China’s ultimate goal is, of course, that the State of Israel should also join this zone; however, in accordance with the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission of April 30th, 1999, China acknowledges and endorses that “Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established on the basis of arrangements free arrived at among the States of the region concerned.”(iii) Furthermore, China is certain that, once the State of Israel feels that all the potential nuclear threats in the region have been neutralized, it will show no hesitation in joining the NWFZ. All of the nations encompassed by the proposed ME-NWFZ that have previously replied to the possibility of the establishment of such a zone, have done so in the affirmative. The Republic of Iraq has “affirm[ed] its support for the establishment”; the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan “supports endeavors aimed at the establishment”; the Syrian Arab Republic “welcomes efforts to establish”; the Islamic Republic of Iran first proposed the establishment of a NWFZ and “will continue its strong support”(iv); and the State of Libya, on behalf of the members of the League of Arab States has “supported the call for the establishment.”(v) Given the clear lack of opposition on the part of any nation other than the State of Israel, China calls for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East that the State of Israel may later join. China is certain that this assembly will constitute the “dialogue,” and that the decisions of this assembly will create the “confidence-building measures” that the State of Israel desires as a prerequisite for participation in a NWFZ.(vi)
The second of these proposed zones would encompass the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, with India eventually joining. Though most of South East Asia is already covered by the NWFZ established in the Treaty of Bangkok,(vii) those nations found in and around the most volatile region of Asia, namely Jammu and Kashmir, and the Arunachal Pradesh area of the Tibet Autonomous Region, are not encompassed within the NWFZ. China is painfully aware that both India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have significant nuclear stockpiles; however, China holds out hopes that India can be enticed to disarm and join the proposed South Asia NWFZ, granting the Islamic Republic of Pakistan a threat-free environment to disarm as well and reducing long-term risks.
China, as the first nations to do so, would also encourage all the Nuclear Weapon States to adopt non-first-use policies.(viii) Non-nuclear weapon states will have far less reason to develop nuclear weapons if all the Nuclear Weapon States have such policies.
In promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, China believes that all nations should consent to Iran’s civilian nuclear program. While China is fully in favor of talks to insure that Iran does not turn its nuclear energy program into nuclear military capabilities, it also grants credence to Iran’s statements that it has no such intent.
In pursuing the ultimate purpose of the NPT: nuclear disarmament, China believes that disarmament should be done bilaterally or multilaterally in every situation of tension.
China would appreciate the leadership of the two nations with by-far the largest nuclear stockpiles, namely The Russian Federation and the United States of America.(ix) If both nations were to further act in the reduction of the stockpiles at the same time, and in according amounts, there would be no risk of negotiations in bad faith. China, however, does not believe that these two nations should completely eliminate their nuclear stockpiles at the present time; the NPT establishes five nuclear states, whose role is to regulate and secure the world and balance each other’s interests; when each nuclear nation retains, for example, approximately 200 warheads, the world will be safer overall.
China proposes that India begin the elimination of its stockpile, to then be followed by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. As India was the nation that necessitated the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities, it is only fair that they enable its disarmament as well. It is China’s firm belief that both of these nations must achieve full eradication of the nuclear arms.
China fully believes that the State of Israel would be willing to destroy any stockpile it may have after a Middle East NWFZ is imposed, and any potential nuclear threat to the State of Israel is vanquished.
In the disarmament of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, China believes that the only solution is multilateral talks among Asia-Pacific and interested nations, including China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United States, and the Russian Federation, in the tradition of the usual six-party talks.(x) China will do its utmost to secure the cooperation of the North Koreans.
In facilitating disarmament, it is also requisite to establish political situations in which all nations will allow United Nations IAEA inspectors onto their territory and into their facilities. The most pressing situations regarding inspection are in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and in South Asia.
China is certain that the Islamic Republic of Iran will be willing, after joining a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, to allow inspectors into their nation to show the world that their intentions are entirely peaceful.
China again intends to exercise its influence to convince the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to allow entry inspectors, and requests the assistance of the international community in this complex task.
China is highly concerned that no nuclear state in South Asian allows full inspections, and thus requests that the international community, by means of the Security Council, move to condemn and impose sanctions on any South Asian state that should continue along this path. Unsupervised nuclear facilities are a threat to the entire world.
If all the measures proposed above are adopted, the states which still have to become party to the NPT (the State of Israel, the Republic of South Sudan, India, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan)(xi) will have no reason to hesitate in doing so.
China also feels that this preparatory committee must address the safe disposal and use of nuclear materials. China believes that the ideal way to do this would be to direct the IAEA to establish a new set of protocols for collaborating with all nations to secure their used fissile materials, to avoid the seizure of these materials by non-governmental and terror groups, and to replace old and unsafe nuclear technologies with those of the modern day.
In conclusion, China must state its unequivocal support for the premises of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for the many policy proposals that will strengthen the ability of the Treaty to execute its purposes.
To echo the words of our Russian and American fellows, the nuclear issue is one of such importance that we must not only trust, but verify. That said, the People’s Republic of China is certain of the collaboration of all nations in the ultimate goal of reaching world-wide safety and security.
References:
i Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
ii Report on Steps to Advance the Middle East Peace Process and to Promote the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, 2005
iii Guidelines and Principles for the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, United Nations Disarmament Commission Report, 1999
iv Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East Addendum, Report of the Secretary-General, 2013
v Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, Report of the Secretary-General, 2013
vi Response by the State of Israel to The Secretary-General report: Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations, 2013
vii Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairsviii China: Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1992
ix The Nuclear Weapons States- Who Has Them And How Many, Forbes Magazine, 2014
x Statement by Ambassador Li Baodong, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Security Council Briefing on Nuclear Non-proliferation, Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Security, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, 2012
xi Status of the Treaty Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs